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Positive-Sum Global Justice

Pockets of Prosperity
Aiden sits on the floor in his private bedroom. He connects one block to
another. A $90 Lego Minecraft Nether Fortress emerges from the scattered
pieces. His younger brother, Keaton, pesters him to share the Zombie Pigman
action figure. Finally, Aiden relents, and Keaton smiles.
Both children have Band-Aids on their arms. Yesterday, they received flu
shots. Neither has ever caught the flu, and perhaps neither ever will.
The next day, their parents cart them off, in leather-lined vehicles, to vi
olin, piano, and acting practice. Theyspend the second part of the day playing
with friends. Each day they eat three full and healthy meals, unless they ruin
their appetites by sneaking Trader Joe's pumpkin bars from their pantry.
Several hundred miles away, Miles is playing with his new Thomas the
Train toy. Losing Thomas is about the worst thing imaginable to him. Earlier
today, his father took him to the local Museum of Life and Sciences. Miles
played in the tree houses, saw some farm animals, and took a train ride him
self. Hundreds of other kids were there also enjoying themselves. Miles is
barely two years old, but has already received some of the best health care
available in the world.
The three boys will get twelve years of high-quality elementary and sec
ondary education, and then, we hope, complete four-year degrees at worldclass universities. Afterward, they will likely have their choice of professions.
They are more likely to suffer from a crisis of choosing which occupation best
fits their interests than from chronic unemployment.
Many families are like ours. Their stories illustrate what can happen to
people when they live in places with the right institutions. They are likely
to lead long, prosperous, meaningful, and fulfilling lives of their own
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choosing—or at least as likely as one might ever expect to get. They are likely
to be the authors of their own lives, rather than leading lives forced upon
them by tradition, command, or necessity.
Almost every book on global justice begins by talking about how desper
ately poor some people are. We took a different path. We began by talking
about how rich some people are. We don't do this to rub our good fortune in
the faces of those with less. We do this to draw attention to how remarkable
the existence and relative accessibility of this kind of wealth really is. Wealth,
in other words, is the exception—its the thing that needs to be explained,
understood, and replicated.
In contrast, poverty is boring. Poverty is normal, in a statistical sense. It is
not normal in a normative sense: it is not how things should be. It is normal
in the sense that poverty is human beings' default, natural state. Almost eve
ryone who has ever lived has been desperately poor, malnourished, and at
risk of premature death. Aiden, Keaton, and Miles are highly unusual. When
their parents suffer a misfortune—a car breaks down, the kitchen sink springs
a leak, or even a parent loses a job—this has no noticeable effect on their
lives. That's interesting and strange. Around the world most people, for most
of human history, would have found cost-equivalent setbacks financially
devastating.
Two thousand years ago, everyone everywhere was poor. This state of
affairs seemed permanent. Religious leaders who advocated charity did so to
nourish the soul or ease the burden of poverty, but did not expect that charity,
or anything else, could eliminate poverty altogether. Poverty, it seemed, was
here to stay.
But some places stopped being poor. In some places, there are only pockets
of poverty among vast fields of wealth, where poverty is unusual, something
to be gawked at, where depictions of extreme poverty captivate readers as
much as descriptions of fantastic or alien worlds. In other places there are
pockets of wealth, where the opposite is true. The key to solving world pov
erty is, probably, to figure out why some places became rich and then repeat
or spread the causes of success.
The good news is that this is already happening. In the past 40 years, more
people (in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total population) have
been lifted out of extreme poverty than in all of history before. In 1820, about
95% of people lived in extreme poverty. In i960, about two-thirds lived in
extreme poverty. Now, less than 10% of the world does. Perhaps most remark
ably, these numbers are proportions. Over the same period, world popula
tion has been increasing—especially in the poorest parts of the world. Even
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though there are many more people around, we've found ways of makingsure
fewer are starving.1 This is a miracle, but hardly anyone notices it.
Adam Smith argued that we should measure the wealth of nations not
by the size of the king's army or treasury, but by the fullness of the common
people's stomachs and the opportunities available to their children. In 1776,
when Adam Smith published The Wealth of Nations, most people around
the world were still living in what we would now consider extreme poverty.
Nevertheless, he realized, the typical inhabitants of some countries, such as
the Netherlands or England, enjoyed about three times the standard of living
of the typical inhabitants of others, such as Spain or France.2
The phenomenon—that some countries became rich quickly while others
did not—is often called the Great Divergence. Smith's explanation for the
Great Divergence is that the (now) richer countries had better institutions
and policies, which in turn encouraged higher forms of economic produc
tivity and growth, and these in turn made even the relatively poorest citizens
of those countries richer. The (still) poor countries had bad institutions, bad
policies, and a lot of violence. They're run by what we might call extractive
elites, groups of people who make their money by extracting wealth and re
sources from their people. These things encouraged economic stagnation,
which in turn ensured that the poor remained poor, just as they always
had been.
Ending poverty requires institutions that protect and enhance people s
economic productivity and innovation. Economic growth matters. Indeed,
as we'll see, when it comes to fighting world poverty, it matters more than
anything else.
To illustrate: on most reliable estimates, per capita world product—
the total amount of yearly economic production worldwide per person—
probably just barely doubled between 5000 B.C. and 1800 A.D.3 Since then,
it has increased by a factor of at least thirty.4 Importantly—and this point
will be critical—wealth has been created, not just moved around. In 2014 the
United States produced more real output, by itself, than the entire world did
in 1950.5
Imagine you could redistribute all the income produced in 1000 A.D.
equally among everyone in the world. Even if you did that, the median, av
erage, and modal standards of living would still be what the United Nations
now considers extreme poverty. (According to Angus Maddison, world
GDP/capita in 1000 A.D. was only about $450 in 1990 US dollars.6)
Even John Rawls, the pre-eminent left-liberal political philosopher of the
past 65 years, argues that we should not much worry about redistribution or
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egalitarian ideals of justice until we've reached a suitable level of economic
development.7 When the pie is tiny, it doesn't much matter how you cut it.
Most people will get crumbs. If you want everyone to have a decent slice of
pie, the important thing is to make sure, first and foremost, that there is a lot
of pie.
Some people who read the stories of Aiden, Keaton, and Miles might react
by thinking, "That's not fair! We need to take some of what those kids have
and give it to those who have less." Others might think, "Good for those kids.
We need to figure out away to make everyone have that good of a life." It may
not be obvious now, but these are two radically different ways of thinking
about poverty. And once we see that, there will be little to recommend the
first kind of reaction.

Global Justice as a Positive-Sum Game
Many philosophers who write about global justice defend things like new or
stronger human rights protecting peoples political and civil liberties. They
claim to have discovered various socio-economic rights, like a right to a de
cent standard of living, access to high quality health care, even rights to be
protected from social deprivation. They want to introduce more robust and
more internationally oriented forms of democracy. And they propose, in one
form or another, large-scale redistributive solutions to the problems of world
poverty.
What sets us apart is the question of whether these kinds of proposals
should be the exclusive or primary focus of a theory of global justice. Or, per
haps better, what sets us apart is what the global justice literature tends to
leave out. What's left out is protection and recognition of the basic building
blocks that make development even possible. There is overwhelming evidence
that basic economic rights and freedoms—things like stable property rights,
robust protections of freedom of contract, and a guarantee of the freedom of
labor—are necessary for development.8 The main point of this book is that
these rights are absolutely central to global justice.
The lesson we take from the history of poverty and wealth creation is
that people, societies, and indeed the world flourish more when people are
rewarded for productive activities, the kind of activities that bring valued
goods and services into the lives of others. They wither when what's rewarded
are the kind of extractive activities that thieves, dictators, warlords, and
oppressors like to engage in—the kind of activities in which one party's gain
comes at the expense of another.
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As we'll argue throughout this book, we think global justice requires that
we expand and protect the ways in which people s relations can be seen as pos
itive-sum forms of interaction, and avoid zero-sum (or, worse, negative-sum)
forms. A zero-sum game is an interaction in which one person can win only
if, and only to the extent that, another loses. For example, in poker, no money
is made; it is only moved around. You can win $100 only if someone else loses
money. (In a casino, playing poker is a negative-sum game, as the house takes
a rake.)
A positive-sum game, by contrast, involves interactions through which
people can gain without those gains having to be offset by corresponding
losses for others. At their best, positive-sum interactions make all parties
better off (or at least make no one worse off).9 The paradigmatic case of a
positive-sum interaction is trade. Typically, parties engage in voluntary trade
because they expect to, and generally do, benefit from the exchange. They
might want to make a profit, desire to obtain goods they personally value
higher, or care about benefiting others. In one way or another, trading part
ners typically walk away from an exchange better than they approached it.
Thinking about justice in these terms allows one to see what's wrong with
theories that focus on redistributive proposals as the main solution to the
problems of global poverty. Redistributive policies, while sometimes justifi
able, are zero-sum in nature. They move money from one place to another,
attempting to make the latter better offby making the former worse off.
These zero-sum principles lie at the heart of major theories in the global
justice literature. Cosmopolitan egalitarians argue that helping people in de
veloping countries requires people in rich countries to strongly sacrifice their
self-interest. Nationalist egalitarian theories resist, concluding that people in
the First World do not have to redistribute to the Third World, yet also resist
allowing people to move from the developing to the developed world. Both
views accept the (as we'll soon see, mistaken) empirical claim that helping the
world's poor must hurt the world's rich.
In our view, the goal should be to turn zero-sum forms of interaction
into positive-sum ones, to replace the sources of poverty and oppression
with sources of prosperity and productivity. To put it in slogan form: what
solves zero-sum problems is changing the nature of the game, not changing
who extracts how much from whom.10
To us, the main ingredient of global justice is freeing up people's ability
to put their persons and goods to work where they see this as most valuable.
It means opening borders—allowing people to move where their talents will
be most valued. It means freeing up trade—allowing people to move their

6

IN DEFENSE OF OPENNESS

possessions where they will be most valued. And it means robustly protecting
the economic freedoms and property rights that surround and protect their
abilities to make best use of those opportunities.
In short, what global justice requires is openness. It requires that rich
countries, and the institutions they control, allow foreigners to make mu
tually beneficial, voluntary trades with their own citizens. We will argue,
on a variety of grounds, that everyone everywhere has a right of migra
tion, a right to trade, and right to possess, use, and profit from productive
property.
Thinking about global justice in these terms fits with a broader view of
justice to which we are attracted. In our view, when justice obtains, that's
supposed to be a welcome thing, something to celebrate rather than bemoan.
(And the reasons for celebration are more than merely the fact that justice
would obtain.) The point of justice, among other things, is to make our world
a good place for everyone to live in.
If justice is achieved, we can see others as people we are glad to welcome
into our communities—local, national, or the human community at large.
We can see others as people who bring something to the table, people who
will end up making our lives go better and not threats to our own lives, goals,
and freedoms. We can celebrate the birth of others' babies and the arrival of
new immigrants, because they bring us fellow cooperators rather than mouths
we will end up having to feed. And, perhaps most importantly, when justice
obtains, we can see ourselves as people others have reason to welcome, people
who offer promise, advantage, and progress.
We defend these conclusions out of humanitarianism, out of concern for
the plight of the world's poor. We fail to do right by others, and especially
the poor, when we don't recognize their contributions, productive poten
tial, and resourcefulness. We fail to do right by people when we picture them
as mouths to be fed, rather than the cooperators and contributors that they
would like to be. We fail to do right by them when we treat them primarily as
consumers rather than producers.
As anyone who has ever visited a developing country will know, the
world's poor are extremely enterprising." They find ways, against great odds,
of providing for themselves and the people they care about. Their cities are
bustling with commercial activity, from small vendors to people collecting
cardboard boxes on the street, and those searching garbage dumps for metals
to sell. These people are not helpless victims. They are people who work hard,
make plans, and find ways to survive and better themselves as well as others.
They are victims, to be sure, but the main perpetrator is not a global order that
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fails to provide for them. It's a global order that fails to welcome them and
allow them to make their contributions, and the local orders that feed upon
them like parasites.

False Starts
Theories of justice can go wrong in a variety of ways. They can invoke mis
taken moral principles. Or they can invoke mistaken empirical claims, leading
them to misapply correct moral principles. Or they can go wrong by making
their principles not sufficiently sensitive to the empirical conditions in which
they are supposed to apply.
This will be a recurring theme throughout this book. That ending poverty
requires positive-sum forms of cooperation may seem like a mere empirical
claim. But it makes a difference morally, too. Knowing what actually has a his
tory of making a difference helps one appreciate what's morally appropriate to
demand of others. And flawed moral principles often look attractive because
they match flawed empirical views.
Many people believe that global justice requires mass redistribution from
rich to poor countries. We'll take a close look at their arguments in later
chapters. We've noticed that many of the people who are attracted to these
redistributive views find them appealing at least in part because they also
hold empirically inaccurate beliefs. They often endorse one or more of the
following claims:
• The reason some countries are rich and others are poor is that natural
resources are unevenly (and therefore unfairly) distributed around the
globe. The rich are rich because they have or had access to more or better
resources than poor countries.
• The reason some countries are rich and others are poor is that the rich
countries extracted resources from the poor countries. The history of colo
nialism is a key causal explanation of economic development.
• We can easily end world poverty if rich countries simply redistribute a
large enough portion of their wealth to the developing world.
These, of course, are economic claims. But they play an important role in
many people's normative thinking. In one form or another, they represent
what we're calling zero-sum analyses of poverty and development. They re
gard world poverty as a simple problem of resources being misallocated: too
much here, too little there.
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Once claims like these are accepted, and the zero-sum framework is es
tablished, the natural next step will be to search for moral justifications for
redistributing wealth in order to fix the misallocation.
But these empirical claims are false starts. They misdiagnose what caused
the Great Divergence, and they misidentify what steps actually have a chance
of solving world poverty. The Great Divergence did not result from there
having been a common pool of resources and, at some point, the rich taking
more than their fair share, taking what belonged to others, and so on. The
causes of prosperity have to do with turning the zero-sum forces of extraction
into positive-sum forces of real production and innovation. Whatever might
be the correct principles of justice must fit that point. They must include and
empower the productive powers of the worlds poorest, enabling them to
better themselves and others.
Changing the intuitive appeal of redistributive solutions to global justice,
then, requires setting straight the empirical misconceptions that give these
proposals their intuitive force. The next section does this.

The Fact of Growth
It bears repeating: everyone used to be poor. Almost all people everywhere
throughout human history lived under what we now would refer to as "ex
treme poverty." Economist Brad Delong estimates that in 5000 B.C., per
capita world product—the total amount of yearly economic production
worldwide per person—was only about $130 (in 2.002 USD), and barely
doubled to $250 by the year 1800.12 Economist Angus Maddison, whose his
torical data is widely used, offers higher numbers: $457 USD (1990 dollars)
in 1 A.D., rising to $712 USD in 1820.13 The exact numbers are somewhat
disputed. But it's not disputable is that extreme poverty was once widespread
and normal, and now it is not. Until recently, almost everyone everywhere
was poor.
When the history of economic growth is drawn on a chart, as in Figure
1.1, it looks like a hockey stick.14 We condensed the period from 1 to 1500
A.D. (and all of human history before that) because, despite rising and falling
empires, golden and dark ages, the lines hardly move. Had we not done this,
the picture would be even more dramatic. From the beginning of time until
about 250 years ago, pretty much nothing (in terms of income per capita)
happened. There were occasional blips and dips, as a good harvest might feed
a few extra bellies, or a bad war might leave them starving, but the norm was
that everyone was poor. As John Maynard Keynes put it:

Positive-Sum GlobalJustice

9

GDP/Capita, 1 AD-2003 AD

Year

figure i.i GDP/Capita, i A.D.-2003 A.D.
Source-. Maddison 2007, 70.

From the earliest times of which we have record ... down to the be
ginning of the eighteenth century, there was no very great change in
the standard of life of the average man . . . Ups and downs certainly.
Visitations of plague, famine, and war. Golden intervals. But no pro
gressive, violent change. Some periods perhaps 50 per cent better than
others—at the utmost 100 per cent better than before—in the four
thousand years which ended (say) in A.D. 1700.15
Then something changed. The stagnation ended. In the past 200 years, per
capita world product has increased by a factor of at least 30.16 Absolute
levels of wealth grew faster than the population at large. People—as in en
tire countries—got richer. Today, some of the richest countries in the world
(e.g., Singapore) enjoy average standards of living that are 80 times that of
the poorest countries (e.g., Burundi).17 Average people in the United States
consume per week roughly what most people in sub-Saharan African coun
tries consume per year.18 There is a huge gap between the wealth, income, and
standard of living of the people in the richest countries and that of the people
in the poorest countries.
This was not always so. In 1821, the gap between Western Europe and the
world average was only about two to one, while the gap between the richest
and poorest countries was only about five to one.19 If we go back further into
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history, the gap closes. Indeed, early medieval Europe was poorer than China
at the time. In iooo A.D., every person in every geographic region had roughly
the same (poor) standard of living.20
Note the shape of the curves in Figure i .i . Yes, Western Europe and the
Western European offshoots grew faster than the rest of the world, and, yes, as
a result, the gap between Europe's standard of living and the rest of the world
grew. But notice that even the poorest regions enjoyed some growth. It's not
that Western Europe and the European offshoots grew rich while the other
countries became even poorer. It's not as though Western Europe grew rich
at the rate others grew poor, which would suggest a zero-sum reallocation of
a fixed stock of existing wealth. Rather, the other countries for the most part
started off as poor, and got slightly richer over time, while the European coun
tries and their offshoots started off as poor, and got much richer over time.

The Quality of Institutions Trumps Everything Else
When Thomas Pogge, perhaps the leading theorist of global justice, writes
about global justice, he defends one of his preferred redistributive proposals
by pointing out that the world's rich have unilaterally excluded the poor from
their fair share of the worlds natural resources. Pogge thinks this unjust be
cause people worldwide have a claim to "a proportional resource share."21
Redistribution is justified, according to him, in order to set straight this une
qual access to resources.
Sometimes remarks like these are offered as an explanation of why rich
countries became rich. However, as such, they simply don't hold up.22 As
economist David Weil summarizes the empirical literature in his textbook
Economic Growth, "the effect of natural resources on income is weak at best."23
Natural resources can help, but they can harm development as well. For in
stance, China after the 1950s was and remains poorer than Singapore or Hong
Kong, though the latter have no natural resources to speak of. The USSR was
poorer than the United States, though the USSR had better natural resources.
In Adam Smith's time, the Netherlands and England were richer than France,
though France had more and better natural resources. And so on.
Indeed, while natural resources can sometimes spur growth, they fre
quently inhibit growth. Economists refer to this problem as the "resource
curse." Countries with a high concentration of easily extractable natural re
sources frequently suffer from economic stagnation. There are competing
theories of why this is so (though these theories are largely compatible, as
they identify what might be jointly contributing causes). One theory holds
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that countries with abundant natural resources "do not develop the cultural
attributes necessary for economic success," in part because necessity is the
mother of invention.24 Another theory is that countries that enjoy resource
booms tend to just consume the sudden influx income in an unsustainable
way. They don't develop capital, but eat away the extra income until it's gone.
Yet another theory, called the Dutch Disease theory, holds that a sudden
abundance of resources leads to contractions in manufacturing.
But the most popular theory (or, more precisely, the theory thought to
identify the most significant set of causes) is that when a country enjoys
abundant resources, this encourages governments to act in destructive ways.
Government officials can just extract resources for their own selfish ends, and
can afford to ignore or oppress their own people. Fighting over control of
the resources can lead to civil war. But the dynamics needs not be so violent
or nasty. "Nicer" governments might create unsustainable welfare programs,
programs they can only afford so long as commodity prices for that resource
stay high.2'
Contrary to resource-based explanations, the dominant view in develop
ment economics is that sustained economic growth results from having good
economic and political institutions.26 Institutions, Nobel Laureate Douglas
North writes, "are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."27 These rules can
set the terms for social interaction in different ways, ranging from the harmful
to the productive. The view that setting these terms in the most productive
manner is the key to explaining growth has quickly become dominant in eco
nomics.28 While no one thinks that institutions are all that matters, their im
portant is widely seen as paramount. As economist Dani Rodrik summarizes,
"the quality of institutions trumps everything else."29
Of course, the field of economics is as full of disputes as any other. And
it's by no means uncontroversial what kinds of policies might lead to devel
opment. Still, economists largely agree on a number of basic conclusions,
such as that countries with robust systems of private property, protected by
the rule of law, and governed by strong, inclusive states, offer much better
prospects for significant and sustained development than those that lack such
protections.30
Figures i.z through 1.5 illustrate some of these correlations. Note that we
are not trying here to demonstrate or prove that these findings are correct.
Our goal here is articulate some of the main results of social scientific in
quiry that theories of global justice ought to incorporate. We are reporting
their findings and summarizing their reasons, but readers should refer to the

IN DEFENSE OF OPENNESS

12

10-

10
Avg. Protection Against Risk of Expropriation, 1985-95

FIGURE 1.2 Average Protection Against Risk of Expropriation, 1985-1995
Source-. Accmoglu and Robinson 2005, 403.
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economics literature directly if they want to see a rigorous demonstration of
these conclusions.
Figure 1.2. appears in a review paper by Acemoglu and Robinson. It
illustrates that countries with better protection of private property tend to
be richer.31
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 use data from James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and
Joshua Flail's Economic Freedom of the World 1014 and 2016 annual reports.32
Each year the Fraser Institute, a Canadian think tank, rates countries according
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Economic Freedom and the
Income Earned by the Poorest 10%
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Fraser Institute Economic Freedom Quartile
2016 Index of Economic Freedom

F I G U R E 1 .4 Economic Freedom and Income Earned by the Poorest 10%
Source-. Gwartney et al. 2,016.

to their commitment to economic freedom, taking account of such factors as
access to sound money, free trade, ease of starting and doing business, ease
of investing capital, the protection of property rights, and the degree of gov
ernment control or manipulation of the economy. The most economically
free countries, according to the report, include Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, and Switzerland. Many of the Scandinavian countries—which some
Americans mistakenly refer to as "socialist"—beat the United States overall
on economic freedom, and others beat it on many central aspects of economic
freedom. (The Wall Street Journal, together with the Heritage Foundation,
produces a similar index, and gets similar results.33)
Figure 1.3 shows the correlation between overall economic freedom, as
rated by the Fraser Institute report, and GDP/capita, as measured by the
World Bank.34 Figure 1.4, which is taken directly from the Fraser Institute
report, shows the relationship between economic freedom, and the absolute
level of income of the poorest io%.35 Note that Figure 1.4 measures income
before internal transfers or welfare payments take place. The freest countries
are also the richest countries, and generally have the most generous welfare
systems. Thus, Figure 1.4 understates how well the "poor" do in the freest
countries.
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Figure 1.5 is similar to Figure 1.3. Each year, the World Justice Project
produces a Rule of Law Index, which rates countries by the degree to which
countries adhere to the rule of law, aggregating such factors as checks and bal
ances on government power, the absence of corruption, openness of govern
ment, protection of human rights, provision of order and security, effective
regulatory enforcement, and proper and effective provision of civil and crim
inal courts.36 In Figure 1.5, we plot the Rule of Law Index score for various
countries, as assigned by the World Justice Project, against GDP/capita (as
measured by the World Bank), and find a robust correlation.
Again, these charts merely show correlations. They are not enough on
their own to demonstrate causation. We place them here only to show readers
just how robust the correlations are. At the same time, there is evidence that
the relationships illustrated here are causal—it's not just that richer countries
happen to do a better job protecting private property, but that protecting pri
vate property leads to increased prosperity.37
One way to illustrate the power of institutions is to examine countries
that have recently become more capitalist, or less capitalist, and then see how
these changes affect their development in the short term. In a recent paper,
economist Peter Leeson examines what happened to countries that become
more capitalist between 1980 and 1005, and compares their performance to
countries that became less capitalist in that same period. The countries that
become more capitalist also enjoyed about a 33% increase in real per capita
income, about five extra years of life expectancy, about a year and a half of
extra schooling per capita, and saw dramatic increases in how democratic
they are. The countries that became less capitalist saw their income stagnate,
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life expectancy drop, and became less democratic. (They did, however, enjoy
about half a year's worth of extra schooling per person.38)
The basic mechanisms that produce these results are fairly well under
stood. As Daron Acemoglu and Robinson argue in their important book Why
Nations Fail, the main difference between good and bad institutions concerns
the degree to which they foster extractive activity or encourage cooperation
and productivity. The main difference, they argue, has to do with whom the
institutions empower, and thus whom the institutions benefit. What they call
inclusive institutions empower people across society, and thus tend to benefit
all. By contrast, extractive institutions empower only some, and thus tend to
benefit only those small groups of people at others' expense.
On the political side, inclusive institutions require a state that strikes a
tricky balance between a reasonable level of centralized power and pluralism.
Pluralist governments represent many different groups and interests in so
ciety, through free and competitive elections, and governed by the rule of
law. Such inclusive political institutions avoid the destructive outcomes that
fall on the opposite extremes on a spectrum of political violence. On the one
extreme, there is anarchy and civil war. These are the result of insufficient
political centralization. On the other extreme, there is tyranny, oppression,
and rent-seeking. These are the result of too much concentration of political
power. Societies that find themselves too close to either extreme tend to con
tain extractive political institutions.
On the economic side, inclusive institutions secure people's rights to pri
vate property, including private property rights over productive resources,
and allow these to be held broadly across society. These allow societies to ex
perience the kinds of specialization, exchange, investment, and innovation
that increase productivity. Acemoglu and Robinson write:
Inclusive [economic] institutions... are those that allow and encourage
participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that
make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals
to make the choices they wish. To be inclusive, economic institutions
must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a
provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which
people can exchange and contract; it must also permit the entry of new
businesses and allow people to choose their careers.39
Extractive economic institutions, by contrast, are those that limit or alto
gether prevent the ability of people across society to individually own private
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and productive property, engage in commercial and profit-seeking activities,
and enjoy the fruits of their investments and innovations. Such institutions
stifle productivity. The effects are ugly:
Nations fail today because their extractive economic institutions do
not create the incentives needed for people to save, invest, and in
novate. Extractive political institutions support these economic
institutions by cementing the power of those who benefit from the ex
traction ... In many cases, as... in Argentina, Colombia, and Egypt,
this failure takes the form of lack of sufficient economic activity, be
cause the politicians are just too happy to extract resources or quash
any type of independent economic activity that threatens themselves
and the economic elites. In some extreme cases, as in Zimbabwe and
Sierra Leone... extractive institutions pave the way for complete state
failure, destroying not only law and order but also even the most basic
economic incentives. The result is economic stagnation and—as the
recent history of Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe
illustrates—civil wars, mass displacements, famines, and epidemics,
making many of these countries poorer today than they were in the
1960s.40
All this illustrates the importance of the political and economic institutions
that facilitate production, exchange, and innovation. The rights, rules, and
liberties that make up such institutions form the basic engine of develop
ment. They are the things that make it possible for people to leave behind the
conditions of poverty and oppression. They help societies move away from the
zero-sum logic of extraction and toward the positive-sum logic of growth and
prosperity. A good theory of global justice would take these points very seri
ously. It would give pride of place to individual property rights, the freedom
to exchange, and the liberty to move and migrate. The theory of justice we
develop in this book does just that.41

Our Argumentative Strategy
This book is divided into three parts. The first part identifies and defends three
elements of a more open world. What unites these elements is that they each
are instrumental in widening the scope of potential positive-sum interactions
in which people can engage. They protect and empower people who want to
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bring their persons and goods to others who might desire them around the
world, on terms each party can see as beneficial. As we'll argue, this means
recognizing people's rights to migrate and trade freely around the world.
We begin this first part of our argument by defending, on intuitive, moral,
and economic grounds, the right of people to move where they please, just as
Jason and Bas are free to move anywhere in the United States at will. This is
the purpose of chapter z. Chapters 3 and 4 then rebut a range of objections
to the idea that borders should be opened. Chapter 5 then makes a similar—
intuitive, moral, and economic—case for free trade. In chapter 6, we defend
this again from a variety of objections. Finally, in chapter 7 we argue that the
basic rights undergirding the right to trade freely, rights that we call people's
productive rights, ought to be recognized as core human rights.
In chapters 8 through 10, we respond to a number of arguments claiming
that global justice must be much more redistributive in nature. In particular,
we address three strategies one might take to defend such an approach—
strategies that focus on what we might call the past, present, and future.
The first of these, discussed in chapter 8, takes a backward-looking
approach, arguing that large-scale redistribution is justified because people in
the developed world owe people in the developing world compensation for
past imperialism and colonialism. Chapter 9 looks at arguments which try to
defend such redistribution in order to correct the injustice of today's unjust
world order. And in chapter 10 we examine the forward-looking argument
that bases global redistribution on the interpersonal duty to prevent future
suffering.
Finally, chapter 11 responds to what we regard as the most pressing ob
jection to our view. The objection claims that since increased growth would
exacerbate climate change, it should be avoided altogether, or at least be lim
ited as much as possible to only the developing world. While we share the
objector's concern about the dangers of climate change, we argue that this
does not undercut our conclusions.
Throughout this book, we will rely upon common-sense moral intuitions
and ideas rather than any grand moral or political theory. Thus we will not
be attempting to show what Kantianism, Rawlsianism, utilitarianism, or
some other grand theory implies about global justice. Instead, we will begin
with widely shared principles and ideas. When we challenge common-sense
conclusions about global justice, we will do so on the basis of more basic and
strongly held common-sense moral ideas, beliefs or empirical arguments.
As part of this method, we will use thought experiments that set up
analogies between moral theories and more familiar interpersonal cases.
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The use of such thought experiments is familiar: it allows us to test whether
different proposed theories are consistent with deeply held and shared moral
beliefs.
But that's not the only reason we have chosen to rely on this method. The
other reason is that such examples help engage our moral imagination. They
allow us to stay alive to the fact that the questions we're asking concern real
people, living real lives, making real decisions in ways they see as most ap
propriate given the circumstances. This is important because when questions
of global justice are put in the abstract, these facts are easy to lose sight of.
Powerful psychological heuristics encourage us to think of foreigners in
simplified, and often unfair ways—as monolithic groups of people, a "they"
who, in one way or another, threaten whatever makes us an "us." We want to
guard against these dynamics by drawing attention to the fact that these are
people, persons who have much to offer, if only given a chance.
As a result of this method, we avoid relying on idiosyncratic or easily
dismissed moral principles or empirical premises. We think it's deeply prob
lematic when philosophical treatments of justice rely on highly controversial
views, say, about the connection between justice and material equality. And
we think it's deeply problematic when theories of justice prescribe solutions
that evade, ignore, or cherry-pick the empirical evidence about the conditions
most conducive to the creation of prosperity and economic and political
development.42
One might think that a book defending global justice as global freedom
would have to do something of this kind, too. It might have to deny moral
duties of assistance, or would rely upon implausible ideas about libertarian
self-ownership. Others have offered arguments of this kind,43 but this is not
our approach. Instead, we will argue that the conclusions of global openness
we defend are consistent with—indeed demanded by—widely shared inter
personal moral intuitions.
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